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This paper examines the interdependency of the women's labor force activity and household child
care choices in Russia.
In the days of the Soviet Union, more women participated in the labor force than in almost
any other country in the industrialized world. In the 1980s about 90 percent of prime-age women
were either employed or went to school (Lapidus, 1985). Women in the Soviet Union worked
full-time the whole year round. There was very little part-time employment; less than one percent
of the work force was employed under such arrangements.
Soviet women could not have been involved in the economy to such an extent if a wide range
of government-subsidized child care programs, such as nurseries, preschool, kindergartens, and
after-school programs, had not existed. The number and variety of state-provided  child care facilities
increased steadily throughout  the Soviet  era. By the late 1980s  some 15 million children  between one
and six years of age (70 percent of children from that age group) were registered in public child care
institutions (Matthews, 1986).
Reforms launched by the Russian government in early 1992 lead to a dramatic change in the
socioeconomic environment in Russia and put a great strain on the existing system of social
protection and state-subsidized institutions. A sharp decline in GNP in the 1990s  resulted in an ever
widening budget deficit, shrinking government-funded programs, and a dramatic decline in the
number of state-run child care organizations.  According to GosKomStat (the Russian government's
national statistics agency), the proportion of children in preschool facilities dropped by more than
50 percent (GosKomStat, 1995) between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s.
Not only has the number of kindergartens and nurseries decreased sharply, but the cost of
sending children there has soared. In the days of the Soviet Union, families' child care costs were
partly or totally covered by subsidies from the federal and local governments and/or by funding from
employers. By now virtually all government child support programs in Russia have been eliminated
and only a handful of companies can afford to pay for the daycare services for their employees 1
children. This affects all families with young children and low-income families in particular.
Thus, over the last decade, the situation in Russia has moved from one in which child care
was provided by the government and almost all households with children had access to affordable
and often free-of-charge child care facilities, to one in which the cost of day-care is becoming an
important determinant of household labor supply decisions.
The research described in this paper is prompted by the complexity of the problems faced by
families with children in the transitional economy and by the significant impact that the reform in
the child care system has had on the political and economic environment in Russia.
This  study  appears significant in  light  of  many contemporary economic theories  of
childbearing and female labor force participation.  The availability  and affordability  of child care are
significant factors in a mother's decision about whether to enter, reenter, or remain in the labor force,
and on her consequent decisions about her fertility (Blau and Robins 1989; Leibowitz et al. 1988).
In addition, the availability, convenience, or costs of child care may prevent some women from
participating in the labor force or from getting a full-time job (Bloom and Steen 1990; Blau and
Robins 1989; Floge 1985). Such constraints may be especially acute among less-educated women
or unmarried mothers (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Presser and Baldwin, 1980). To the extent that child
1care represents yet another important mechanism in the process by which social inequality is
disproportionately experienced by women and children, a better understanding of the child care
choices and effects on children raised within different socio-economic  groups  will inform  theoretical
and policy discussions about the contexts in which economic changes enhance or compromise
children's development.
In this paper, I model households' child care choices, the decisions that Russian mothers
make about whether to participate in the labor force, and the number of hours that they work. Using
a model of consumer demand for state-provided child care, I estimate how the price of child care,
mothers' wages, and household income all affect households' behavior and welfare.
The econometric model that I use is derived from a theory described in the literature on the
household decision-making about women's participation in the labor market and about child care.
The theory has several testable predictions. I test the hypotheses implied by this economic theory by
jointly estimating reduced-form models of both the discrete and continuous choices of households
using the method of Semi-Parametric Full Information Maximum Likelihood (SPFIML). This
method takes into account the error term correlations across outcomes, and correlation of the error
terms that can result when panel data are used.
The estimation reveals that the decision that mothers make about participating in the labor
force and about the number of hours they work are relatively sensitive to changes in hourly wages,
and, to a lesser degree, to changes in the cost of child care. To examine how household behavior is
affected by child care subsidies and hourly wage policies, I use simulations based on the paper's
estimates. These simulations indicate that the payment of family allowances to households with
children does not have a significant effect on whether or how much they use formnal  child care or
whether and how much the mothers work. However, a decrease in child care cost has a strong
positive effect on the labor activity of women with children and on the use of formal child care.
This is the first study to analyze the mothers' employment, mode choice, and demand for
formal child care in Russia in a unified framework. I use this approach because of the simultaneity
of the household decisions about modes of care, employment and demand for child care. Analyzing
all these decisions together has enabled me to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of the child
care prices and of the level of wages on the discrete and continuous outcomes.
Until lately, there has been little research on the economics of child care outside of the United
States. Recently, a certain amount of research on child care has been conducted in the nations of
Western Europe where (as in the US) growing numbers of women with young children have been
entering the workforce (see, for example,  Gustafsson and Stafford, 1992; Cleveland,  Gunderson and
Hyatt, 1996; Van Den Brink and Groot,1997). To date, there is only a very limited amount of
research on child care and women's labor market activity in the developing countries. This includes
a paper by Wong and Levine (1992) that focuses on child care and household time use by analyzing
the effects of household composition on mothers' employment in Mexico. A paper by Connelly,
DeGraph and Levison (1996) examines the effect of child care arrangements on the rate of women's
participation in the labor force in Brasil. To my knowledge, there are no formal economic studies
of child care in Russia.
This paper is based on recent progress in the theory of demand for child care and women's
labor supply in the U.S. Methodologically, the paper follows the work of Blau and Robins (1988),
Ribar (1992 and 1995), Conelly (1992), Michalopoulos, Robins, Garfinkel (1992), Kimmel (1995,
21996), Averet, Peters and Waldman (1  997) all of whom jointly model households' decisions about
child care and mothers' decisions about entering the workforce.
32. Theoretical model
The analysis applies to households with children under seven years of age. There are three
forms of child care available  to households in Russia: informal care provided by the mother, informal
child care provided by other household members, and formal child care. For households with
children and two parents, the husband is considered a potential provider of free child care. In a
household with a single mother who has no relatives living with her, it is assumed that any informal
child care is provided by children themselves or relatives who live outside the household.
The theoretical  model used in this paper is based on the assumption that household members
make choices about their consumption of child care quality, of market goods, and of leisure. A
household's decisions as to the quality of child care it wishes to obtain, and about the amount of time
each member of the household can work are motivated by the desire to achieve the highest level of
household welfare. Household utility maximization occurs at the point where: (i) the ratio of the
marginal utility of the market good consumption to the marginal utility of the quality of child care
purchased on the market equals the ratio of their respective  prices, and (ii) the loss in utility from an
additional hour of work is offset by the gain in utility from the additional consumption of market
goods that becomes possible due to the additional earnings and utility that are yielded when the
household substitutes formal child care for in-house care.
This theoretical framework makes it possible to model a wide range of household child care
choices and labor supply decisions that involve various combinations of formal and informal care
that are typical of the extended household structure that is prevalent in Russia.
The model is made tractable through a number of simplifying assumptions. First, it is
assumed that children require continuous care. Second, the household structure and the number of
children are assumed to be exogenous. It seems reasonable to make this assumption, even though
it has been shown (Blau, Robins, 1989)  that household fertility decisions depend on the cost of child
care, because of a relatively short time span covered by the three rounds of the survey and rapid
changes that are occurring in the prices of child care. Third, the assumption is made that free child
care is available for a mother during the entire time she is at work. The assumption is important to
enable me to apply the same theoretical framework to households with different structure. Also, this
assumption reflects the fact that the availability of acceptable options is a major influence on the
mother's decision to work. Forth, it is assumed that household members derive utility from the
quality of child care they choose. This utility is represented by the discounted value of a potential
improvement in children resulting from a higher quality of child care or by the current utility of the
family knowing that their children are in competent hands. Fifth, it is assumed that mothers spend
all their free time on child care, i.e., that the mother's leisure time and time she spends caring for
children are perfect substitutes. This, of course, is a simplifying assumption, but Blau and Robins
have demonstrated (1989) that no new insights are achieved by separating the time that a mother
spent on child care from her leisure time. Sixth, it is assumed that households can use all three types
of child care at once, in which case the average quality of child care is the weighted sum of the
quality provided by the different sources. In other words, it is assumed that there is a perfect
substitution between the child care arrangements. In the model, the quality of child care provided
by the mother and/or by the other members of the household is considered to be exogenous.
However, the quality of market-provided care can be chosen by the household.
4In the one-period utility maximization problem the household chooses its consumption of
a Hicksian composite good G, the average per hour quality of child care Q, the leisure time of the
mother Lm,  and the leisure time of other household members L.  subject to its budget and time
constraints. The household utility function is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable and
quasi-concave:
MaxU  =U(Lm, Lo, G, Q).  (1.1)
The total  quality  of child  care Q is the weighted  sum of the exogenous  quality  of the child  care
provided by the mother Qm,  the quality of child care purchased on the market Qp,  and the exogenous
quality of child care provided by relatives Qo:
Q =Q/Lm +Qp(Hm -T.)+Q.To  (1.2)
The budget constraint includes total household expenditures on child care as a function of the
number of children in the household, of the per unit quality price of child care, of the quality of
formal care, and of the time spent by the children in care:
G = E +Wm}H[m  +WOHo-NPqQp(  H-To),  (13)
where E is the exogenous non-wage household income, Hm  is the mother's actual work time, Ho  is
the other household members' actual work time, N is the number of children in the household, Pq  is
the exogenous price of the unit of quality of formal child care, T. is the amount of time spent by
other household members on child care, Wm  is the market wage available to the mother, and W0
indicates the market wage available to the other household members.
Finally, the model specifies - under the assumption that children require constant care- the
time constraints affecting the mother, the other household members, and the children:
Lm +Hm  =L4 +1Ho +To =1  (1.4)
Ho -TO  20  (15)
0 <To, Ho,LLmm,  <1  (1.6)
Solving 2 the first-order conditions of the household utility maximization problem (1.1-1.6) with
respect to Lm,  Lo,  To,  and Qp  as a function of the exogenous variables, it is possible to show that there
is no full interior solution for those situations when the household freely chooses all four variables:
Lm,  Lo, To, and Qp, i.e., when the mother works, other household members work, child care is
provided by the working mother when she does not work; by other working family members during
periods when the mother works and they do not work; and by a formal child care provider during
periods when both the mother and the other family members work 3. There are, however, five
2 For a formal  derivation  of the solution  for the household  utility  maximization  problem,  for
corner  solutions  maximization  problems  and for comparative  statics  results see Lokshin  (1999).
3 The  existence  of only  corner  solutions  of the model  (1.2-1.6)  results from  the two assumptions
imposed on the model, i.e., the assumption about the perfect substitution between the modes of care and
the assumption about the perfect substitution between the mother's time of leisure and time mother spend
5meaningful corner solutions of the model that are presented in Table 1.
The  household  simultaneously solves  the  following two-part  problem  of  its  utility
maximization. Assuming a given corner solution, the household optimizes the labor supply of its
members and chooses the optimal quality of child care. Subsequently the household chooses the
corner solution with the highest utility.
How the exogenous variables affect the probability  that a household will choose a particular
type of child care arrangement and will choose whether its members participate in the labor force
can be determined by analyzing the first derivatives of the indirect utility functions for every corner
solution with respect to the variables of interest.
An increase in the mother's wage Wm  will increase the probability that the household will
choose the states in which the mother is employed by raising the indirect utility values for states
1,2,3, and 4, and leaving the utility for state 0 unchanged. An increase in the per unit quality price
of child care Pq does not affect the utility of choosing such states when no formal child care is
purchased (states 0, 1, and 2). Such an increase would lower the utility of selecting the states where
a household uses formal child care (states 3 and 4). A increase in the wage rate of family members
WO  will increase the utility in states 1  and 3. An increase in the quality of mother-provided  child care
Qm  will raise the utility in each state. However, because in states 1-4 Lm<  1, the increase in utility will
be the greatest in state 0, i.e., when the mother does not work. An increase in Qo  will raise household
utility in those states in which other family members provide child care (states 1, 2, and 4) and thus
increase the likelihood of a household selecting these states. In case of state 4, the time constraint
and non-negativity  condition result in T,<Hm.  Thus, the exogenous change in the quality of informal
child care makes it more likely that households will choose states I and 2, in which the household
only uses informal care, than state 4, in which household uses both formal and informal child care.
The first order condition of the household utility maximization problem (1.1-1.6) can also
be used to determine how exogenous variables affect the number of hours that the mothers devote
to employment and the number of hours children spend in paid care. If it is assumed that formal child
care is a normal good, then an increase in the price of formal care is likely to decrease the number
of hours of formal child care purchased by households. If the wages available to mothers increase,
then this is likely to increase households' use of formal care. The effect of wages and the cost of
child care on mothers' labor supply appears undeterminable  by the theory.
3. Empirical model
The empirical model used in this paper consist of a discrete choice equation for the child care mode
and mother's labor supply, an equation for a mother's hours at work, and an equation for children's
hours in paid care.
For the discrete choice model, the utility that the ith household derives from the choice of the
jth alternative at time t can be expressed in linearized form as:
*,  =R,  ±+£,j,  =Xi, /+Zi,, y+,,  j =0'.'4  (2.1)
caring  for children  (Assumption  5 and 6). However,  the  relaxation  of these  restrictions,  offers  no new
testable  insights  into the model.  The  empirical  observations  about  the actual  choices  of child care and
labor  supply  of Russian  households  confirm  the validity  of the chosen  theoretical  approach.
6where Qii,  is an indirect utility function for household i choosing state j at time t, Xit is the vector of
the household characteristics  that affect the choice of the ith household at time t and that do not vary
by state, Zij is the vector of outcome-specific  variables, ,B  and y are vectors of unknown parameters,
and E  is a random disturbance that reflects, among other things, unobservable attributes of the
alternatives. The probability that the household i chooses state j at time t is then:
Prif( j) =Pr[Q>i  >  2e  for any  j￿q]
=Pr[e-ji,-er  > X(,6ti, -/jjt)  +Z(yit  -Yjie)  for  any jqgl]
The demand functions of a mother's
hours at work and hours spent by children in formal care can be specified in a linear form as:
H,ik  t  herek=  K  (2.2)
Here, H,,k  is the continuous dependent variable k associated with household i in state j at time t. In
the first continuous outcome equation, H 2, 1 is the number of hours that a mother supplies to the labor
market (if she works), and H 1'2 is the number of hours spent by children in formal child care facilities
in those states where formal child care arrangements have been chosen. Xit  and Z4 are the vectors of
the variables defined above, pk and ak are vectors of unknown parameters, and Cit  is an error term
with mean zero.
The theoretical model assumes that a household makes simultaneous decisions about the
mode of child care it wishes to use, the labor supply of each of its members, the amount of time that
each family member spends on child care, and about the amount of time that their children spend in
formal care. All of these decisions are determined by the exogenous characteristics of the family and
individual family members, both observable and unobservable. It is possible to estimate discrete
choice equation (2.1) and continuous variable equations (2.2) jointly.
There are several estimation issues that need to be discussed. First, the error terms in the
discrete e and continuous Vk  equations may be correlated across states and among each other. The
correlation across states is a correlation among disturbances in the state-specific indirect utility,
functions V 1jt's.  If, for instance, a mother's participation in the labor force is determined by, among
the other factors, some unobservable taste for work, it is going to hold true for all of the states in
which a mother works.
The  same example of an unobservable preference for work can help to  illustrate the
possibility of a correlation among the errors terms of equations (2.1) and (2.2). In the continuous
equation, the number of hours that a mother supplies on the labor market depends, among other
things, on her taste for work. Women with a high preference for work can be expected to work
longer  hours and are more likely to be employed. This means that there may be a correlation  between
the disturbance in the equation for a household's choice of a discrete state and the equation for the
amount of time that women supply on the labor market. Similar correlations can exist for the
equations that determine the following: (i) labor supply decisions of the other family members, (ii)
time spent on child care by the mother and the other family members, and (iii) household child care
arrangements.
In addition, because panel data are used in the model, there exists the possibility of a
correlation in the error terms among the multiple observations of the same family (correlation
between Eii, 2 and ejjtl,  t1tt 2 and correlations between  ,tlk  and  iC 2k,  t1 #t2).  Macro time effects (not
7household-specific) in disturbances e and i  can be controlled by the introduction of time-specific
dummy variables into equations (2.1) and (2.2).
If it is assumed that the errors are not correlated when in fact they are, then the point
estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To account for such possible error correlations in a
tractable way I impose a factor structure on the disturbances in equations (2.1) and (2.2):
-'i,,  =  4j,  + Pi 1VI  i + Pi,  2  V2  i  (3.1)
1=  At  + fjVIi + Z 2V2U  (3.2)
4'  =t  +  l  VIi + 5t2V2ti  (3.3)
where pij, is an independent extreme value and ,  Xi,,  and yi, are mutually-independent random
variables that are assumed to be independent  of the regressors in the model. V 1 is a permanent factor
(the factor that remains the same for the household at any time point and  is similar to  the
household-specific effect) while V2 is a transitory factor (within a single household, the factor will
be different at any two different points in time). These factors are unobservable variables that
influence the choices made by households and that have no correlation with explanatory variables.
p's,  's,  and ;'s  are factor loadings that represent the effect of a given factor in each equation.
We introduce a two-factor structure to account for the two major possible sources of
heterogeneity in the disturbances - the inter-equation correlation of the error terms and the panel
structure of data. The use of both time-invariant and transitory factors helps to take into account this
potentially complex form of correlation. These assumptions about the structure of the error terms in
the equations (2.1) and (2.2) are considerably more flexible than the common practice of imposing
a specific functional form of the distributions of v's (see for example, Gourieroux and Monfort
(1996) and Berry and Pakes (1990)).
The system of equations (2.1-2.2) with the error structure (3.1-3.3) can be estimated by the
Semi-Parametric Full Information Maximum Likelihood (SPFIML) method developed by Liard
(1978), and Heckman and Singer (1984), and applied to simultaneous equations by Mroz and
Guilkey (1992), and Mroz (1999).
Assuming the independent, extreme-value  distribution of e, the contribution of the discrete
outcome part of the model to  the likelihood function has  the form  of a multinominal logit,
conditional on V's. Assuming that the error terms of the continuos outcome equations are normally
and independently distributed, these equations contribute to the likelihood function in the form of
normal regressions. I assume that  the distributions of the v's in  equations (2.1-2.2) may be
approximated by the following step functions:
M
Pr(V, = vim) =Pm  P > O and XPm  = 1  (41)
m=4
K
Pr(V 2 =  v 2 k)7zi  )>  Oand  YZ;  =1  (4.2)
k --
where v's  are the points of support in the distribution of the factors 1 and 2, P and Xt are the
probability that the factors take value v, and M and K are the numbers of points of support of the
distribution of each V.
8The above specification implies that each household has an access to all possible child care
arrangements  and all potential employment outcomes. However, a significant  proportion of Russian
families have no access to formal child care facilities. Also, Russian legislation specifies that only
children older than 18 months of age can be accepted by formal care institutions. For these groups
of families the conditional contribution of the discrete outcome equation to the likelihood function
is calculated based on a restricted set of possible forms of care, i.e., that there are no formal care
arrangements available in the choice set of these households:
Households with access to all forms of care  Households with no access to formal care
or households with children younger  18 months
e  e,Xi, +Pj,VI.+P 2 V 2,  e6jx,+A1V1,+A2v2k
Pr(Yj,  =  jIVIm,V 2k)  =  4  for  j=1.4  Pr(Y, =  jilVlmV 2 k)NA  =_2  for  j=1,2
1 +  A'1+A  V1k+A12'2  1+  +  t
k=4  k=4
pr(yi,  =IV°lmIV 2 k)A  4  Pr(yi,  =  0JIVI.mV 2k)NA=  2  (5)
1 + YeA,9,,+"v  1 +  A;eXl+flVl8+An2V2k
k=1  k=i
where Pr(Yit=jlvlm,v 2k)A is the probability that household i (which has an access to formal child care
facilities) chooses state j  at time  t conditional on the realization of  factors V, and  V2,  and
Pr(Yjt=jlv,m,v 2k)NA  is the same probability for those households with no access to the formal child
care.
For the continuous outcome equations (2.2), the conditional on the v's probabilities are:
1  H.'  -x t d  - Z,;  - 'ZiVIm  - '2V2k 
Pr(H iIv,m,v 2k)=-  Z  -)  (6.1)
a  it
1  .2  2a
Pr(H2  vl  ,Hv 2k  )=t  it  ZitJ Y  -1Vlm-2V2k)  (6.2)
i,'l.  2k  ki  C2it
where Hi,, and Hi, 2 are the dependent variables in the continuous outcome equations (2.2), 4 is the
probability density function of standard normal distribution, and a'it and a2i, are the square roots of
the variances of the error terms in equations (2.2).
Thus, the semi-parametric  log-likelihood function for the system of equations (2.1-2.2) with
the error structure (3.1-3.3) is:
N  M  T  K
3  =jn(,Pm[J7Ijzk  Pr(YI, =  jlvlmv 2k )  Pr(Yt  =  jVIlmsV 2 k  )  Pr(Hi,'  vjm,V2k  )Pr(Hj,  IV,m,V 2 k )]) (7)
i4  m=lI  t-1  k/ri
where N is a number of households in the sample, T is the number of times that a household appears
in the sample (the total number of observations in the sample is T*N), M is the number of points of
support for the first factor, Pm  are probability weights associated with the first, time-invariant  factor,
K is the number of points of support for the second, transitory factor, 7rk are probability weights
associated with the second factor, vim  and v2k are the points of support of the distribution of factors
9V, and V2.
Choosing a priori numbers of points of support M and K, the log-likelihood function q  is
maximized over a's,  n's, y's,  'Ts, c's, P's,  i's,  and v's. For identification purposes, the two points
of support for both factors are normalized to equal 0 and 1, respectively 4. The number of points of
support is increased until the difference in the log-likelihoods  of consequent maximizations satisfies
the convergence criteria. 5
The joint distribution of the error terms (3.1-3.3) is unknown, so the sample statistics of the
estimates cannot be derived analytically. It is feasible to estimate the covariance matrix 0) of the
coefficients in the model (2.1-2.2) by inverting the Hessian matrix of the second derivatives of the
log-likelihood function W. However, the numerical approximation of the Hessian matrix can be
difficult to obtain when the values of certain estimates by far exceed the rest of the coefficients, or
when the function becomes flat near the optimum. In the paper I use method of bootstrapping to
determine the correct standard errors for the estimated coefficients.
Let S,=Si(Yit*,Hlit*,H  2 *,Xjt*,Zit*),  i=l,...,n  be a randomly drawn with replacement sample
from the empirical distribution. It follows from the model (2.1-2.2) that Hlit*, H 2it*,  Yit*, are
functions of Xi,*  ,Zi,*  and the error terms. Let ,Bj*  denote a vector of the bootstrap estimates obtained
from a maximization  of the log-likelihood function 9 on the sample S1.This process can be repeated
B times to yield bootstrap estimates , I  *... PB*.  The bootstrap estimator of the asymptotic  covariance
matrix 0 is given then by
0=  . I(-Il3  )(4-I3)'  where 8  = B  D.
The estimates of the base  sample coefficients are used  as  starting points  for  the bootstrap
optimization in order to speed up the convergence. The covariance matrix El is estimated based on
B=500 bootstrap repetitions of the log-likelihood maximization, which should provide a suitable
level of accuracy for the estimated standard errors (D. Andres, M. Buchinsky).
4. Data and Variables
4The  functional  form  for the normalization  of probability  weights,  the points of support  for the
likelihood  faction  (6) and the estimated  parameters  are given  in the  Appendix
5 As a convergence  criteria  I use Akaike's  information  criteria,  recommended  by Gritz  (1993).
According  to this method  the full model  is estimated  with an increasing  number  of points of support,
until the improvement  in the value  of the log-likelihood  function  SE  is less than  the number  of additional
parameters  estimated.  In the case  of two-factor  model,  this method  is applied  first to determine  the
number  of points of support  for the permanent  factor  V,. Then,  keeping  the number  of points of support
of the permanent  factor  constant,  the "optimal"  number  of points of support  for the time-variant  factor  V2
is determined  by increasing  the number  of points of support  for that factor until additional  point  of
support  fail to produce  any significant  improvement  in the value  of log-likelihood  function.
10This research is based on the data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 6, the
first and only nationally  representative sample of households in the Russian Federation. The survey
comprised seven rounds conducted in (D)  September 1992, (11)  February 1993, (1E1)  August 1993,  (LV)
November 1993, (V) December 1994, (VI) October 1995 and (VI)  October 1996. Rounds I-IV
surveyed over six thousand households while Rounds V, VI and VII surveyed a different panel of
approximately  four  thousand  households.  The  data  were  weighted  across  the  rounds  for
comparability and to ensure that the survey was representative on the national scale.
In this analysis, I use a pooled sample of households with children younger than 7 years old
based on the results of the last three rounds of the survey. The data on the first four rounds of the
survey (1992-93) gathered no information on the availability of child care facilities, which makes
it impossible to apply the model of child care choice and labor market behavior to the households
covered in the first four rounds.
The initial sample of households for rounds V, VI, and VII of the survey was identified from
a stratified three-stage cluster sample of residential addresses. Cities as well as urban and rural
portions of rayons (political and geographic units about the size of counties in the United States)
were the area units selected in the first stage. These 38 rayons were stratified by the eight regions
and by the percentage of the urban population within each region. Within each area chosen in the
first stage, a sample of voting districts (primary population points) was randomly chosen from a
geographically ordered list of voting districts falling in that area.
There are 1,262 households with children under the age of seven in the pooled sample of
rounds V, VI, and VII, and these households are represented by 2,162 observations (an average of
1.77 observations per household). The data set includes information on the individual members of
these households, household-specific  information and data on the community level. It also contains
information on the modes of child care arrangements made for each child in the household, the
amount of time each child spent in formal and informal child care, and the amount of money paid
for formal child care during the week of the survey. The part of the questionnaire that was
administered to each individual household member yielded data on how much time each household
member spent looking after children and was active at the labor market, as well as information on
their monthly wages. The part of the questionnaire that was administered to one respondent per
household on matters that affected the household collectively yielded information on any non-wage
household income and on the household's  composition. The part of the questionnaire that was
administered to a group of respondents who represented the whole local community yielded data
about the availability  of different forms of child care, and this information was collected for each of
the 160 primary population points.
4.1 Dependent variables
6 The weights  and a range  of issues  related  to the sample  design  and collection  of these  data are
explained  in depth  in the documents  that can  be found  in the  home  page  of the RLMS.  The data sets can
be obtained  free  through  the home  page: www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.  Lokshin  and
Popkin  (1999),  and Lokshin,  Popkin,  Harris (1999)  give  additional  information  on the sample  and data
set.
11The dependent variable for the discrete outcome equation is defined according to the possible
combinations of a mother's employment  status and the mode of child care, which are shown in Table
1. These combinations are: (0) - the mother does not work and stays at home with her children; (1)
-the mother works, the other household members also work, informal child care arrangements are
used; (2) - the mother works, the other household members do not work, informal child care
arrangements  are used; (3)  -the mother works, the other household members work, formal child care
is used; (4) -the mother works, the other household members do not work, both formal and informal
care arrangements are employed. The distribution of households by the mothers' labor force
participation and by the mode of child care is presented in Table 2.
More than 45 percent of households with young children have non-working mothers. The
percentage of mothers who stayed at home with their children increased slightly from 1994 to 1996.
Among the households that use other types of care, the largest single group is formed by families
using household members other than the child's mother as child care providers. A third of the
households with a working mother use this type of care. A relatively high share of the families, 8
percent, used only formal facilities for child care. And a small minority of Russian households uses
both formal and informal child care.
Table  3 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variables for continuous outcome
equations, i.e., the time that mothers spent working and the time that children spent in formal care.
Both continuous  outcomes are observed only among the sample of working mothers or on the sample
of children in formal care.
4.2 Explanatory variables
The definitions and descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the system of equations
(2.1-2.2) are presented in Table 3. Several key variables of interest are discussed in details below.
Price per quality unit of child care (P).  In the RLMS, households reported their weekly
expenditures on child care and the time that their children spent in a formal child care facility during
the week of the survey. There is no direct way to relate such information to the quality of child care
provided as no data were collected on the regional characteristics  of child care facilities (such as the
sizes of groups of children in pre-school establishments, quality of personnel, etc.). Like Blau and
Robins (1988), I assume that the quality of formal child care is uniform within a population point 7
and I use the average local per hour price of care as a proxy for the child care price.
Mother's offered wage (W,,  The wage rates available to each mother have been imputed
using Mincer's (1974) type earning function regression with a control for selectivity (standard
Heckman correction) 8 run on a sub-sample of working women for whom hourly wage data were
available. The hourly wage has been calculated as a ratio of the women's monthly earning and the
7 The average  prices of child care are calculated  for 30 population  points in the sample.  Each
population  point  includes  about  40 households  with children.
8 Regression  coefficients  for the wage equations  are shown  in the Appendix  2. For identification
in the selection  equation  I use the standard  set of household  characteristics  that can influence  the
mother's  labor  force  participation  decision,  but are uncorrelated  with the potential  wage rate.
12total number of hours they worked during the month the survey has been administered. In the
absence of data on the total amount of time a mother had worked during the preceding month, the
imputations were made based on the number of hours worked during the week of the survey.
In the wage regression, the following explanatory variables have been used to predict
mothers'hourly earning - the mother's educational level, her age, details on the region she lived, the
type  of settlement  where she lived (urban-rural), the number  of children she had (as a proxy for work
experience), her marital status, and the amount of time she had been in her current main job.
Imputations are made based  on the  women's  predicted hourly wages with the job  tenure of
non-working mothers being equal to zero. Here the offered wage is assumed to be a wage that a
mother could earn if she were to start a new job.
Ofered wages ofotherhousehold members (Wa:The wage rates available  to otherhousehold
members are calculated in a similar way to the wage rates available to mothers.  Different regressions
were run to predict wages for household members of different ages or genders. After the imputations
two methods were used to obtain the wage WO.  Under the first specification the offered wage of other
household members  is equal to the lowest wage earned by any household member except the mother.
The second specification uses  the average wage of all working household members as an explanatory
variable in the model.
Non-wage household income (E): Non-wage income is measured as the household monthly
income from all sources other than the wage income. This may have included social security
transfers, private transfers, in-kind inconme,  and income from home production. The structure of
household income changed over the rounds of the survey and certain adjustments were made to
ensure compatibility of the income data across all of the survey rounds..
Other explanatory  variables include some individual characteristics  of the mother such as her
age and level of education, household demographics and size, the number of children in the




The results of the estimation of the system of simultaneous equations (2.1-2.2) are presented for the
specification with four points of support for the permanent factor V, and four points of support for
the transitory factor V2. A further increase in the numbers of points of support M and K failed to
result in a significant  increase in the value of the likelihood function 9. The estimated coefficients are
shown for the model estimated with (V,>O  and V2>0) and without (V1=O and V2=O)  adjusting for
unobservable  heterogeneity. The estimation of the model without  adjusting for a possible correlation
in the error terms between equations (2.1-2.2) is essentially  a joint yet independent  estimation of the
9 Using  more  than  four points of support  for each factor  lead to a significant  increase  in the time
of convergence  for the optimization  procedure.  The  bootstrap  technique  that uses multiple  optimizations
of the log-likelihood  function  would  require  a prohibitively  long time for the estimation  of the standard
errors  in that case.
13modified multinominal logit (MNL) of the form (4) for the discrete outcome and two ordinary least
square (OLS) estimations of continuous outcome equations.
According to the likelihood-ratio test criterion, the MNL'OLS specification is rejected in
favor of the SPFIML estimation. The log-likelihood  value for the independent  MNIVOLS  estimates
is -9650.50  based on 164  parameters. The log-likelihood  value for the SPFIML  estimate is -9362.65
based on 182 parameters. This is an increase of 287.85 in the log-likelihood value for 18 additional
parameters. This means that using the model that does not control for any correlation in the error
terms may have biased the estimated coefficients and introduce inefficiencies in terms of the size of
the standard errors.
Tables 4a and 4b present the estimated coefficients of the discrete outcome equation for both
specifications. The effect of mothers'wage rates on the discrete outcomes was much stronger when
SPFIML was used than it would have been if it had been assumed that the error terms for all states
were independent. For example the coefficient on the log of mothers' wages for state I estimated by
MNL is one third of the value estimated under SPFIML specification. The effects of the child care
prices on household discrete outcome choices are also stronger if the model is estimated  by SPFIML.
While both methods produce estimates  consistent with the predictions of the economic theory, using
SPFIML yields more accurate estimates.
Estimates of the continuous outcome equations are shown in Table  5. The estimated
coefficients of the independent equation of the hours of work are consistent with the coefficients of
the model estimated with the selectivity  bias correction.  However, the latter yields  significantly  more
precise estimates. The standard errors of the SPFI4L  estimation are on average 50 percent lower
than the standard errors obtained from the OLS estimation. Both estimations show that increases in
the prices of child care have a strong negative effect on the number of hours that the mothers work,
while increases in wages available to mothers have a significant  positive effect on their participation
in the labor market.
The estimation of the equation of the demand for child care indicates that the correlation of
the error terms reduces the effects of mothers' offered wages and the price of child care on the
number of hours during which households use formal care facilities.
5.2 Simulations
To examine the effects of the estimates summarized above on the model (2.1-2.2) I simulate how
households would respond to changes in the specific parameters used in the model. In a given
simulation,  the same values for all of parameters of interest are assigned to all the households in the
sample. The simulated probabilities for the discrete model outcomes and simulations for the
continuous models are generated for each household at every time point by integrating over the
estimated heterogeneity distribution and then averaging the probabilities across the sample.
5.2.a Discrete outcome model of the household's child care mode and the mother's labor supply
The simulated distributions of the probabilities for the discrete outcome equation are shown
in Table 6.
Price of child care:  I estimate the impact that subsidizing the prices of child care would
14have on the probability, that households choose a particular child care/labor supply mode, make a
particular decision about the labor supply of the mothers, and about the amount of time children stay
in formal care'". As predicted by the theoretical model, these simulations show that an increase in
the per hour price of care discourages households from choosing formal child care arrangements
(mode 3 and 4), and also discourages mothers from working.
If formal child care were fully subsidized (in other words, the price was zero) as opposed to
the current situation in which the average child care price is 5.6 rubles per hour, this would result
in an 1  1.3 percent increase in the rate of mothers' labor force participation. It also would result in a
10.5 percent increase in the use of formal care facilities. On the other hand, increasing the prices of
child care would discourage other  household members from working. Doubling the cost of child care
would decrease by 9.6 percent the proportion of households where other members work. A negative
effect of child care prices on the states where only informal care is used can be attributed to the
existence of a shadow price of the time other household members spend taking care of children,
which can be correlated with the actual market price of child care. Alternatively, this negative effect
of child care prices can be attributed to monetary transactions between the members of a household.
Mothers 'offered wage  rate:  The potential wages that a mothercould earn if she works have
a strong and positive effect on the probability of her participation  in the labor market. A higher wage
offer will increase the opportunity cost of her staying at home and, therefore, will increase mother's
propensity to  work. Simulated changes  in  the  probability that  various  types  of  child  care
arrangements would be chosen and that mothers would participate in the labor force in response to
changes in the level of offered wages are presented in Table 6.
The doubling of a mother's offered wage rate (from 10 to 20 rubles per hour) would increase
the number of households with working mothers by 24 percent.  At the same time, the proportion
of households with non-working mothers would decline from 50.5 percent of the sample to 40.7
percent. This change in the offered wage rate would also affect the distribution of households with
working mothers, particularly in those  where other household members also have jobs.  The
proportion of such households would decline by 17  percent relative to the initial state. The doubling
of the offered wage of the mother would also increase by 19.1 percent the use of paid care facilities.
Offered  wage rate ofother household members:  Anincrease in the wage rate of the otier
household members reduces the probability that the households will choose to keep members other
than the mother from working (states 2 and 4). The third row in Table 6 demonstrates the impact of
an increase in the wage rate available to other household members by 100 percent (from 10 to 20
rubles per hour") - a 14.6 percent increase in the proportion of households where other household
members work. The slight decrease in the number of non-working mothers can be attributed to
imperfect substitution between the maternal and other forms of care. An increase in the wage rates
10  The changes  in the price of care have  no effect on the behavior  of those  households  that  had no
access  to the formal  care  facilities.  These  households,  however,  are included  in the sample  and all the
results are obtained  by averaging  the predicted  probabilities  over the whole sample.
"' The  use 10  ruble wage  subsidies  and 5.6 ruble child  care subsidies  is arbitrary.  Following  Blau
(1999)  1 assume  that the relative  cost-effectiveness  of the two types  of subsidies  is not very sensitive  to
the specific  magnitudes  of the subsidies.
15of  other household members would increase total  household income,  thus  (according to the
theoretical model) discouraging mothers from working. However, as household income grew and
formal care became more affordable, households would switch from the maternal to formal care
mode and the number of working women with children would increase.
Demographic and geographical variables:  Table 7 presents simulations that summarize
the effects of several demographic variables on the discrete outcomes. Households with children
under the age of three are significantly less likely to choose to put themselves in states where the
mothers of these children work. The probability that those households with children younger than
18 months will have a working mother is 50.4 percent lower than the probability that households
with older children will have a working mother. Younger children require more intensive care and,
therefore, have a strongest impact on the likelihood that their mothers will be employed.
This estimation shows that household non-wage income has no significant effect on the
household's choice of a type of child care. However, the household's structure does appears to be
an important  determinant of its choice of child care.  The availability  of grandparents and other family
members in households encourages these households to use informal types of child care and may
minimize their propensity to use formal care. The presence in the household of children between the
ages of seven and twelve years of age and of teenagers has a positive effect on mothers' labor force
participation in all states of child care arrangements. Households in the rural areas of Russia are
more likely to have working mothers than families in the urban or metropolitan areas of the country.
A mother's educational level can be regarded as a proxy for the quality of maternal child
care. Theory would suggest that the mother's educational level would have a negative effect on her
labor force participation, in part because better-educated  mothers are likely to provide higher  quality
care. However, the estimation fails to show any such pattern and instead indicates that mothers who
are high school graduates are 13.2 percent less likely to choose formal child care arrangements  than
mothers with higher levels of education.
Maternal employment and the use of paid care are both higher in single-parent households
than in two-parent households. Such households are more likely to use formal child care, and single
mothers are 10.3 percent more likely to work than married women with children.
5.2.b Continuous outcome models for  women's time spent working and children's time spent in
fornal  care
Women's time spent working:  A simulation of the effects of the exogenous variables
on the mothers'hours of work model confirms the predictions of the theoretical model. An increase
in mothers' wages has a positive effect on the number of hours that mothers spend at work, while an
increase in the costs of child care has a negative effect on their work hours. An increase in the cost
of child care lowers mothers"'effective" wages, which, in turn, makes them work shorter hours. The
effect of child care costs on labor hours is weaker than the effect of wages. The wage rate of other
household members seems to have no significant effect on mothers' work hours. The higher the
household's  non-wage income, the less time mothers work. Of the demographic variables, the
presence of small children in a household decreases the mother's labor activity. On the average,
single mothers work 20 hours more per week than married women with children. Younger and
less-educated mothers tend to work longer hours. Mothers in the metropolitan areas of Russia tent
16to work shorter hours than mothers in rural areas.
Children's time spent informal care:  The theoretical model offers no predictions
about how the prices of child care affect the number of hours that children spend in formal care.
However, assuming that formal care is a normal good, a negative child care cost coefficient of the
hours of care regression could  be expected. Indeed, simulations show that an increase in the average
price of child care within a given  population point decreases the number of hours that children spend
in formal care. The mothers'wage rate has a positive and significant effect on the use of formal care,
while the presence in the household of children under the age of 18 months reduces the household's
use of formal care. The estimations fail to reveal any significant differences in children's attendance
at formal care facilities among different regions of Russia. Better-educated mothers use formal care
more often than less-educated mothers.
6. Robustness
The robustness of these results can be tested by evaluating some of the alternative specifications of
the model (2.1-2.2). Table A3 in the Appendix shows the SPFIML estimation coefficients for the
discrete and continuous outcomes equations where the regressor is the minimum wage rate of the
household members other than the mother. These estimations suggest that using this specification
makes little difference in the effects of the key policy variables compared to when the regressor is
the average wage rate of the household members other than the mother.
The "average wage" estimation results are more consistent with the prediction of the
theoretical model in terms of how the wage rates of the other household members affect their
employment. For those states with the working household members (other than the mother) (states
1 and 3), an increase in the "average wage" variable has a positive effect on their level of labor force
participation. However,  in state I (households  in which the mother and other members work but only
informal child care is used), the "minimum wage" specification results in a negative significant
coefficient for this parameter.
In the continuous outcome equations for the hours of mothers' employment and the demand
for formal care the estimation of "minimum wage" specification shows that the wage rates of other
household members have a weaker impact on the outcomes in both equations. The effects of the
other parameters are not different from the predictions of the "average wage" model estimation.
7. Policy implications
This analysis demonstrates that the price of child care and the wage rates of mothers and other
household members have a strong effect on the maternal employment and on the use of formal child
care. When allocating limited budget funds, policy-makers need to decide what policies are most
likely to improve the well-being of Russian families. The three key policies in this area are wage rate
subsidies, child care subsidies and direct government transfers to the households with children.
These instruments can affect the welfare of Russian households by increasing their income and/or
improving the developmental and educational outcomes of young children.
The discussion in this section provides the information that the Russian government needs
to determine the costs and benefits of accomplishing a given policy objective and to identify the
17tradeoffs involved in attempting to achieve multiple objectives.
The empirical analysis of the model (2.1-2.2) indicates that wage and child care subsidies
have the biggest positive impact on the employment rate of women with children. Wage subsidies
make having a job more attractive than not working. Child care subsidies can affect the utility
derived from working and from using formal care. They tend to increase maternal employment by
inducing certain households to switch from a state where the mother stays at home with her children
to states where the mother works. Child care subsidies also affect households with working mothers
by prompting them to change from informal to formal child care. However, these subsidies do not
in any way affect the level of maternal employment in households with working mothers. Wage
subsidies are paid to all working women with children and thus the net increase in employment will
be reduced by the amount paid to women who already have a job.
The effectiveness and  distributional impact of child care  and wage  subsidies can be
determined through simulations. Suppose, similar to the results in Table 7, the government were to
introduce child care subsidies that make the child care free. These subsidies are available only to the
families that use paid child care. The child care subsidies will induce some non-working mothers to
enter the labor market, and may induce households with working mothers to use more formal care.
The results of this simulation are presented in Table 8. The total government expenditure on fully
subsidized care would consist of its subsidies to those households that were using the formal care
before the new subsidy policy was implemented plus the subsidies to those households that switch
from using informal care to using formal care because of the new subsidized price. This policy
measure would result in a 11.2  percent growth in the number of working mothers" 2 and would affect
471.9 households with children in the sample.
An alternative approach for the govermment  to take would be to introduce wage subsidies for
the women with children. Suppose the Russian government wants to spend the same amount of
money as it spent on child care subsidies on wage subsidies. All households with working mothers
would be eligible for such subsidies. This increase in the hourly wage rate would induce some
mothers who previously did not work to enter the labor market. Also, those mothers who were
employed before the policy was implemented would work longer hours. The number of households
that use formal care would also go up. The magnitudes of these changes can be determined by
solving equation (8):
E =Nb -o+Na  (Wb-+dv),  (8)
where Nb  is the number of the households where the mother works before the wage subsidies, Na is
the number of households where the mother enters the labor market after the increase in hourly
wages, aW is the change in wage rates due to the subsidies,  Wb  is the wage rates before the subsidies,
and E is the government expenditure.  The fixed-point solution of equation (8) with respect to Nb,  Na,
and 8W yields a 5.6 percent growth in women's labor force participation rate under this policy. If
the wage subsidy were equal to the amount of money that the govermment  would otherwise have
spent on child care subsidies, this would increase mother's wage rates by 2.06 rubles per hour, and
12 When  child care subsidies  lead to a raise  in the demand  for formal  care,  this can also result  in
the increase  in the demand  for the labor of prime  age women,  as most of the staff  in the child care
facilities  are women.
181044.1 households would benefit from this policy.
Child care subsidies  would increase maternal employment  by almost twice as much as wage
subsidies. Both measures would increase the total household incomes of the eligible households. In
the case of those households that were using formal child care before the child care subsidies were
introduced, this increase in income would be a result of a decrease in the amount of money that they
previously spent on child care and an increase in the mothers' wage income because she would be
working longer hours. In the case of those households that start using market care because of the
lower prices, and as a result of which the mother enters the labor market, the increase in their income
is generated  by the wage income that the newly-employed  mother brings into the household budget.
The wage subsidies would increase total household income by increasing the household's
earned incomes because of the additional time that mothers who were already in the labor force
would spend at work and because of the additional wage that mothers who had not previously been
working would bring into the household budget after they became employed.
A third policy measure that may influence the welfare of Russian households with children
is a family allowance  transfer. Assume again that the government wants to spend the same amount
of money on family transfers as it spent on the first two policies. According to the model, this would
result in a slight drop in the level of labor force  participation of mothers, but would increase the total
household income by increasing households' non-wage income. All households with children would
benefit from this policy.
These simulations indicate that child care subsidies are substantially more effective than
wage subsidies at increasing employment  per ruble of government expenditure. They would also be
more effective in inducing households to use formal child care.
Comparing  the effects of the above three policies on the income levels of Russian households
with children reveals that the child care subsidies would produce the largest increase in the family
income both for the beneficiaries, and, if averaged out, for the whole sample.  Wage subsidies would
produce the next biggest increase, following by family allowances transfers. Households that use
payed care would experience on the average a 20 percent increase in their incomes as a result of the
fully subsidized  child care. The effect of the wage subsidies would be significantly smaller (yielding
a 7.5 percent increase in total household income), although it would affects more families. The
uniform family allowances would increase the income level of all households with children by only
3.4 percent.
8. Conclusion
Estimating the joint model of households' child care choices, mothers' labor supply decision, and
household demand for formal child care confirm the predictions of the theoretical model developed
in this paper. The estimations  indicate that economic incentives have a powerful effect on the work
behavior of women with children in Russia. The level of wages available to them and the costs of
child care can both be expected to affect women's  labor force participation and labor supply
decisions. Child care costs affect which child care arrangement  households choose. When the costs
of care are high, this discourages households from using formal child care and increases the number
of households that rely only on informal care.
Government subsidies on child care may increase the number of mothers who work, thus
19increasing the incomes of poor households and lifting some families out of poverty. The simulations
in this paper have shown that measures such as subsidies aimed at reducing the costs of market child
care are more effective than measures that increase women's wages in increasing the number of
mothers who work and the number of hours that they work.
in reducing  poverty.
A significant proportion of Russian households with children use a network of family
members to provide most of their child care. Those families in which some members do not work
are unlikely to use paid care as informal care is available from those family members. It would
appear that in Russia this kind of informal care has substituted for the care that used to be provided
by the Soviet government, which would explain the fact that there is still a relatively high level of
participation  by women in the labor force despite the sharp drop in the number of kindergartens and
nurseries in the last 10 years.
Further research is needed in several areas. First, this paper has assumed the perfect elasticity
of the labor market with respect to an increase in women's labor supply. However, given Russia's
shrinking economy, it seems unlikely that the market could actually accept a significant influx of
women without any wage adjustments. An increase in the women's labor supply might lead to a drop
in real wages, which would mean that the actual effects of the policies simulated in this paper would
be quite different. This may also be true of the child care market where an increase in the demand
for the formal care might cause the market prices of child care to increase.
The next question that needs further research is the distributional impact of the various
potential government policies. Even if the child care subsidies produce, on average, the largest
increase in the household income (compared to subsidizing  wage rates or having a system of family
allowances), it is unclear which households would benefit most from these subsidies. The poorest
households with children in Russia may not benefit from this kind of subsidies, which means that
other policy measures would be needed to improve the well-being of such families.
The serious limitation in the present analysis is the lack of direct information on the quality
attributes of care provided under different arrangements and at different facilities. While the data
used in this paper are averaged by population point, center-specific information would be more
appropriate. Further work should also consider marriage and fertility decisions of the households as
factors that may influence households' choices of child care arrangements and its members' labor
supply decisions.
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23Appendix
In  the SPFIML estimation the following functional forms  were  assumed in  estimating  the
probability weights ir and P, and the points of support V 1 and V2:
Zr."  exp(bmn),  1  IYm
mn  =  X  )  n =l...,  N-1  N4
1+  Yexp(bmn  )  1 + Eexp(bmn)
Vm  1 exp(amn)  n = 2,..., N-I  VmI  =  0;  VmN  =1
mn  +  exp(amn  )
Table A  1.1 Points of support, probability  weights and factor loading for the SPFIML  estimation with
3 points of support for both transitory and permanent factors
Permanent factor  Transitory factor
Point of support
V(1)  0.0000  0.0000
V(2)  0.0453  0.3576
V(3)  1.0000  1.0000
Probabilities
P(1)  0.3244  0.4073
P(2)  0.6743  0.5772
P(3)  0.0012  0.0153
Factor loadings
Discrete outcome equation
p(l)  0.0000  0.0000
p(2)  90.6366  -10.2445
p(3)  107.6548  -77.1019
p(4)  169.2239  15.0137
p(5)  171.8540  10.0019
continuous outcome equation
Hours of work p  17.5526  9.6144
24Table A2: Selectivity corrected wage regression estimation for different age/gender groups
Women < 25  Men < 25  Women 25-54  Men 25-59  Women >55  Men > 60
Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err
Age  8.779  11.928  10.808  10.044  0.147  0.115  -0.168  0.123  1.658  2.924  2.726  2.399
Age squared  -0.400  0.563  -0.510  0.474  -0.004  0.003  0.005  0.003  -0.029  0.045  -0.040  0.037
Age cubed  0.006  0.009  0.008  0.007  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Education
Hligh school  Reference
Technical/Vocational  0.467  1.160  -1.084  1.061  -0.497  0.190  -0.189  0.198  2.209  1.559  -3.381  1.507
University  1.540  3.169  2.138  3.175  0.104  0.212  0.057  0.212  -0.220  1.457  -3.328  1.343
Location
Rural areas of Russia  -0.736  0.576  -0.586  0.456  -0.112  0.177  -0.189  0.195  -0.524  0.446  -0.864  0.466
Urban areas  of Russia  -0.338  0.561  -0.133  0.461  0.384  0.179  0.414  0.195  -0.505  0.444  -0.581  0.467
Metropolitan  areas  Reference
Interactions
Age/vocational  -0.033  0.053  0.050  0.047  0.013  0.004  0.005  0.004  -0.039  0.024  0.052  0.024
Age/university  -0.059  0.139  -0.071  0.137  0.006  0.005  0.002  0.005  0.007  0.024  0.059  0.022
Rurual/vocational  0.493  0.349  -0.143  0.295  0.223  0.122  0.095  0.137  0.365  0.333  0.933  0.388
Rural/university  0.343  0.595  -1.312  0.974  0.366  0.141  0.323  0.152  0.358  0.287  -0.363  0.474
Other urban/vocational  0.437  0.279  -0.012  0.251  0.082  0.108  0.048  0.123  0.588  0.271  0.689  0.348
Other  urban/university  0.085  0.368  -0.618  0.403  0.043  0.111  0.156  0.112  0.477  0.215  0.268  0.299
Time dummies
Round 5  Reference
Round 6  -0.374  0.108  -0.191  0.098  -0.184  0.033  -0.230  0.037  -0.165  0.085  -0.402  0.093
Round 7  -0.236  0.112  -0.091  0.104  -0.111  0.034  -0.200  0.038  -0.097  0.089  -0.255  0.096
PSU characteristics
Average wage 94/10000  0.109  0.028  0.019  0.017  0.022  0.006  0.021  0.007  -0.024  0.026  0.047  0.017
Average wage 95/10000  -0.069  0.030  0.020  0.018  0.016  0.007  0.014  0.008  0.054  0.026  -0.016  0.019
Average wage 96/10000  -0.363  0.489  0.794  0.436  -0.293  0.146  -0.612  0.165  -0.133  0.378  -0.247  0.411
entni94  0.007  0.899  -0.933  0.745  0.600  0.259  1.094  0.292  0.393  0.695  -0.476  0.655
25Table A2: (Continues)
Women < 25  Men < 25  Women 25-54  Men 25-59  Women >55  Men > 60
Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err
Unemployment rate 93  3.896  4.805  8.600  4.171  8.296  1.386  8.175  1.592  -1.077  3.800  10.508  3.865
Unemployment rate 94  -4.239  6.955  -3.457  5.802  -0.914  1.912  -1.744  2.131  -9.342  5.406  4.316  6.350
Unemployment rate 95  0.028  3.980  -0.805  3.589  -3.332  1.121  -4.129  1.232  6.254  3.417  -9.507  3.537
percent of loss making  -0.520  0.800  -0.640  0.660  0.000  0.210  0.290  0.240  -0.700  0.560  -0.790  0.630 enterprises
percent of profit to previous year  -0.059  0.066  0.007  0.058  0.008  0.020  0.059  0.022  0.055  0.052  0.076  0.055
Long term credit  per worker  1.825  1.880  1.580  1.639  -0.505  0.538  -0.189  0.637  -1.203  1.662  -0.465  1.645 percent to previous year
Short term credit per worker  0.070  0.126  -0.082  0.102  -0.034  0.033  -0.066  0.038  0.199  0.113  -0.265  0.129 percent to previous year
Constant  -62.097  83.817  -73.735  70.626  -0.523  1.496  3.544  1.580  -28.597  62.740  -56.721  52.225
26Table A3: Discrete outcome SPFIML model estimation with heterogeneity, specification with the
minimum wage for the other household members.
Mode of child care and household labor supply arrangement.
Case when the mother  does not work is used as a reference.
Other work  Other do not work  Other work  Other do not work
Informal  Informal  Formal  Informal & formal
child care  child care  child care  child care
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.
Presence of children
younger than 18 months  -2.52  0.48  -3.23  0.68  -5.38  1.00  -5.80  1.00
1.5-3 years old  -1.30  0.42  -1.90  0.58  -3.98  0.82  -4.18  0.97
3-7 years old  0.33  0.43  0.28  0.61  -0.32  0.86  0.27  1.04
7-12 years old  0.99  0.37  0.79  0.52  0.77  0.48  0.14  0.59
12-18 years old  1.34  0.46  0.46  0.61  3.20  0.57  2.69  0.66
Family size  6.54  1.37  -2.60  1.94  3.86  1.73  -5.32  1.97
Number  of children in the household  -8.40  2.34  3.49  3.55  -16.23  2.56  -0.95  2.93
Number  of pensioners  -3.96  1.99  1.86  2.81  -14.36  2.39  -14.35  2.84
Single mother household  -0.64  0.48  1.15  0.61  0.98  0.53  2.56  0.59
Households with two parents  Reference
Household incomes
Household non-wage income  -0.58  1.38  1.45  1.61  -0.57  1.53  0.15  1.74
Log wage rate of others  -2.51  1.77  -8.10  2.00  0.72  2.49  -11.03  2.45
Log of average cost of child care  -2.32  1.05  -2.49  1.39  -2.53  1.20  -4.04  1.54
Household regional dummies
Other  urban  areas of Russia  -0.25  0.34  -0.10  0.45  -2.49  0.46  -2.16  0.52
Moscow and St. Petersburg  -1.27  0.62  -1.41  0.84  -0.69  0.78  0.76  0.98
North and North-West  -1.32  0.58  -2.13  0.76  3.05  0.62  4.21  0.76
Central and Central  Chernozem  0.41  0.49  -0.22  0.68  2.74  0.58  3.39  0.73
Volgo-Vyatskiy  -0.59  0.51  -1.55  0.69  2.56  0.55  2.81  0.73
North Caucasis  0.01  0.46  -0.72  0.68  1.41  0.60  1.70  0.78
Ural  -0.18  0.50  -1.08  0.66  3.35  0.56  4.16  0.71
Western Siberia  -0.18  0.51  -1.05  0.72  1.48  0.65  2.47  0.81
Eastern  Siberia  Reference
Time dummies
Round 5  0.09  0.30  -0.03  0.41  -0.76  0.37  -1.20  0.49
Round 6  0.27  0.31  0.12  0.43  -0.77  0.36  -0.85  0.46
Round 7  Reference
Characteristics of the mother
Mother's  agein  years  1.25  1.17  0.65  1.42  -1.79  1.65  -3.18  1.99
High school completed  -0.51  0.39  -0.40  0.53  -1.35  0.49  -1.02  0.59
Technical/vocational school  0.23  0.36  -0.28  0.49  -0.02  0.46  0.08  0.55
University  Reference
Log of mother's  wage  12.75  3.15  10.80  4.35  19.69  3.55  21.72  3.03
Constant  -4.83  1.17  -1.56  1.74  -31.08  2.14  -28.01  2.17
Table A4: Continuous outcome SPFIML model estimations with a control for heterogeneity
27Hours of work  Hours in formal care
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.
Presence of children
younger than  18 months  -7.29  1.30  -13.19  2.09
1.5-3 years old  -14.29  1.13  1.36  1.85
3-7yearsold  -8.50  1.14  2.99  1.91
7-12 years old  -4.43  1.08  -12.79  1.28
12-18 years old  -6.19  1.02  -11.76  1.37
Family size/lO  43.18  1.39  -2.14  2.84
Number of children in the household/lo  8.92  1.11  120.11  5.84
Number of pensioners /10  9.11  1.15  0.01  2.49
Single mother  household  19.86  1.05  0.17  1.36
Households with two parents  Reference
Household incomes
Household non-wage income/10000  -40.70  1.41  -3.54  1.74
Log wage rate of others /10  7.52  2.43  4.70  3.94
Log of average cost of child care/1O  -18.85  1.04  -3.94  1.43
Household regional dummnies
Other  urban  areas of Russia  0.16  1.08  1.04  1.01
Moscow and St. Petersburg  -22.29  1.14  1.03  1.55
North and North-West  -22.27  1.05  2.41  1.35
Central  and Central  Chernozem  -15.92  1.09  -0.45  1.23
Volgo-Vyatskiy  -2.46  1.02  -4.21  1.32
North Caucasis  -7.45  1.21  -2.62  1.47
Ural  -20.53  1.13  -0.25  1.24
Western Siberia  -20.85  1.02  -0.88  1.41
Eastern Siberia  Reference
Time dummies
RoundS  -11.80  1.04  -0.12  1.06
Round 6  3.20  1.03  -1.64  1.06
Round 7  Reference
Characteristics of the mother
Mother's  age in years /100  5.63  1.07  1.83  2.59
High school completed  14.52  1.03  -1.04  1.11
Technical/vocational school  18.53  1.03  -2.50  1.03
University  Reference
Log of mother's  wage/1O  58.79  2.34  -5.21  5.04
Constant  121.59  1.05  -3.38  3.12
28Table 1: Solutions of the household utility maximization problem
Mother works  Other household  Informal child  Formal child care
members work  care
-Lm>>1  Ho>0  1-L,-To>O
TO>O
0  No
1  Yes  Yes  Yes  No
2  Yes  No  Yes  No
3  Yes  Yes  No  Yes
4  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
Table 2: Distribution of households with children 0-7 years old by the choice of child care arrangements
RLMS Rounds l-VII, 1992-96.
Rounds  of survey
Child care mode  V, 12/94  VI, 10/95  VII, 10/96
Mother does not work  45.0  46.2  47.3
Others do not work, informal care only  22.7  23.2  18.5
Others work, informal care only  8.0  8.6  8.8
Others work, formal care only  19.7  15.8  18.8
Others don't work, formal and informal care  4.5  6.2  6.6
Total number of households  796  695  670
29Table 3: Summary statistics for  the explanatory variables, the means and standard deviations. Pooled
sample, rounds V-VII, RLMS.
E,xplanatory  variables  Mean  Standard  Deviation
Log of mother's imputed hourly wage  2.43  0.42
Log of the other household members imputed hourly wage (average)  2.43  0.83
Log of the other household members imputed hourly wage (minimum)  2.34  0.85
Log of the average cost of child care  1.80  1.08
Mother's work hours per week  36.67  13.87
Hours per week children spend in formal child care facilities  41.09  22.28
Non-wage household income  3300.88  855.1
Presence of children 0-18 months  0.19
Presence of children 18 month - 3 years old  0.22
Presence of children 3 - 7 years old  0.67
Presence of children 7-12 years old  0.26
Presence of children 12-18 years old  0.17
Mother's age in months (years)  367.6 (30.6)  94.7 (7.9)
Total number of children 18 years old and younger  1.68  0.89
Number of pensioners in the household  0.17  0.42
Mother's years of education  12.3  3.6
Single parent family living alone indicator  0.05
Single parent living with grandparents indicator  0.06
Other households with single parent  0.04
Nuclear family living alone  0.54
Nuclear family living with grandparents  0.16
Other households with nuclear family  0.06
Other households with children  0.09
Metropolitan areas indicator  0.09
Other urban areas indicator  0.66
Rural areas indicator  0.25
Sample size  2169
30Table  4a: Discrete outcome SPFIML model estimation with heterogeneity
Mode of child care and household labor supply arrangement.
Case when the mother does not work is used as a reference.
Other work  Other do not work  Other work  Other do not work
Informal  Informal  Formal  Informal & fonmal
child care  child care  child care  child care
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.
Presence of children
younger than  18 months  -3.12  0.49  -3.64  0.70  -5.38  1.00  -5.80  1.00
1.5-3 years old  -1.45  0.45  -1.89  0.62  -4.13  0.91  -4.73  1.22
3-7 years old  0.55  0.45  0.73  0.64  -0.80  0.93  -0.90  1.30
7.12 years old  0.97  0.40  0.81  0.54  0.32  0.54  -0.16  0.67
12.18 years old  1.27  0.47  0.43  0.64  2.43  0.62  1.95  0.76
Family size  7.45  1.44  -0.40  1.90  2.31  2.04  -3.57  2.34
Number of children in the household  -8.87  2.41  1.43  3.29  -10.98  3.77  -0.05  4.50
Number of pensioners  -3.84  2.23  1.70  3.07  -12.01  2.88  -10.54  3.84
Single mother household  -0.33  0.50  1.36  0.62  0.64  0.53  1.92  0.62
Households with two parents  Reference
Household incomes
Household non-wage income  -0.15  1.94  2.50  2.43  -0.96  2.10  -0.06  2.56
Log wage rate of others  0.25  2.21  -8.09  2.66  726  3.26  -6.36  3.09
Log of average cost of child care  -3.19  1.16  -3.39  1.52  -2.93  1.36  -4.45  1.73
Household regional dummies
Other urban areas of Russia  -0.36  0.36  -0.04  0.47  -2.23  0.50  -1.70  0.56
Moscow and St. Petersburg  -1.54  0.67  -1.52  0.88  -1.15  0.87  0.24  1.19
North and North-West  -1.29  0.63  -2.12  0.80  2.54  0.71  3.38  0.94
Central and Central Chernozem  0.65  0.53  -0.10  0.70  2.83  0.73  3.17  0.90
Volgo-Vyatskiy  -0.44  0.56  -1.51  0.72  2.34  0.70  2.29  0.91
North Caucasis  0.40  0.52  -0.30  0.71  1.78  0.79  1.80  1.00
Ural  -0.12  0.57  -1.13  0.73  3.05  0.72  3.49  0.90
Western Siberia  -0.14  0.55  -1.10  0.73  1.30  0.75  2.11  0.96
Eastern Siberia  Reference
Time dummies
Round 5  0.03  0.29  -0.06  0.39  -0.81  0.37  -1.19  0.50
Round 6  0.35  0.30  0.21  0.39  -0.63  0.37  -0.66  0.46
Round 7  Reference
Characteristics of the nother
Mother's age in years  1.60  1.35  1.05  1.86  -0.70  1.83  -1.49  2.10
High school completed  -0.46  0.42  -0.28  0.55  -1.31  0.57  -1.08  0.69
Technical/vocational school  0.26  0.38  -0.19  0.50  -0.17  0.51  -0.17  0.63
University  Reference
Log of mother's wage  14.18  4.37  13.24  6.11  17.98  6.15  19.67  6.02
Constant  -6.82  1.44  -3.65  1.82  -14.86  2.40  -11.05  2.41
Table  4b: Discrete outcome SPFIML model estimation without heterogeneity
31Mode of child care and household labor supply arrangement.
Case when the mother does not work is used as a reference.
Other work  Other do not work  Other work  Other do not work
Infonnal  Informal  Fornal  Informal & formal
child care  child care  child care  child care
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coe.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.
Presence of children
younger than 18 months  -1.74  0.27  -1.73  0.38  -5.38  1.40  -5.80  2.31
1.5-3 years old  -0.87  0.25  -1.10  0.34  -2.01  0.49  -2.02  0.72
3-7 years old  0.06  0.25  0.45  0.35  -0.09  0.54  -0.05  0.81
7-12 years old  0.68  0.20  0.48  0.26  0.18  0.25  -0.08  0.34
12-18 years old  0.97  0.24  0.56  0.33  1.14  0.28  1.05  0.38
Family size  4.83  0.69  -2.53  0.95  2.27  0.92  -2.81  1.15
Number of children in the household  -6.57  1.38  2.95  1.81  -6.09  1.76  1.96  1.32
Number of pensioners  -2.05  1.12  2.60  1.32  -5.05  1.38  -3.08  1.41
Single mother household  -0.27  0.26  1.37  0.25  0.28  0.31  1.54  0.35
Households with two parents  Reference
Household incomes
Household non-wage income  -0.15  0.96  1.66  1.09  -0.39  1.16  0.35  1.06
Log wage rate of others  2.28  1.23  -3.29  1.16  7.46  1.92  -3.37  1.49
Log of average cost of child care  -1.27  0.64  -1.07  0.87  -1.31  0.77  -3.08  1.19
Household regional dummies
Other urban areas of Russia  -0.18  0.17  0.02  0.23  -0.75  0.21  -0.29  0.34
Moscow and St. Petersburg  -1.03  0.35  -0.61  0.45  -1.00  0.46  0.16  0.69
North and North-West  -0.55  0.32  -0.85  0.43  0.70  0.38  1.10  0.55
Central and Central Chernozem  0.19  0.27  -0.13  0.35  0.90  0.36  0.67  0.56
Volgo-Vyatskiy  -0.32  0.28  -0.72  0.35  0.78  0.37  0.02  0.57
North Caucasis  -0.02  0.27  -0.29  0.35  0.34  0.39  0.00  0.60
Ural  0.03  0.29  -0.17  0.36  1.34  0.36  1.26  0.54
Western Siberia  -0.32  0.28  -0.68  0.37  0.16  0.36  0.49  0.55
Eastern Siberia  Reference
Time dummies
Round 5  0.14  0.16  0.03  0.21  -0.14  0.19  -0.35  0.32
Round 6  0.23  0.16  0.02  0.21  -0.02  0.19  0.04  0.30
Round 7  Reference
Characteristics of the mother
Mother's age in years  0.64  0.98  -1.80  0.98  -0.50  0.98  -1.32  0.98
High school completed  -0.48  0.77  -0.59  0.82  -0.63  0.85  -0.77  0.97
Technical/vocational school  0.12  0.65  -0.48  0.84  -0.02  0.81  -0.28  0.94
University
Log of mother's wage  3.82  0.99  0.49  0.99  3.68  0.99  0.40  0.99
Constant  -2.88  0.83  0.73  0.84  -2.46  0.84  0.72  0.86
Table 5: Continuous outcome SPFIML model estimations with and without heterogeneity
32Hours of work  Hours in formal  care
No heterogeneity  He  snet  No heterogeneity  ,Hetomencty
Coef.  Std. Err.  C-eL  Std.Err,  Coef  Std. Err.  Coe-  Std. Err.
Presence  of  children
younger  than 18  months  -9.02  10.51  -6:57  4.60  -25.02  3.71  -1390  2.44
1.5-3  years old  -10.99  8.34  -14.03  4.06  0.28  3.29  1.93  2.31
3-7 years old  -4.66  8.10  :4.15  4,27  6.83  3.59  0,61  2.44
7-12 years old  -4.03  6.12  -40  3.04  -18.36  2.82  4  1  -3.  1.59
12-18  years old  -4.59  7.08  -7.31  2.21  -12.63  3.23  -1  1.71  -170
Family size/10  42.9  2.51  40.86  3.2  -1.72  1.16  -3.59  4.72
Number of children in the household/lo  15.8  4.68  14.58  4.16  12.33  2.08  13.13  1.67
Number of pensioners 110  12.5  4.04  10.99  2.))  1.32  1.94  -042,  5.69
Single mother household  20.72  6.75  22.27  2.53  0.86  3.22  -0,54  1.54--
Households with two parents  Reference
Household incomes
Household  non-wage  income/10000  -39.39  31.  05  4-  . 497  -1.96  1.29  -4.1O  6227
Log wage  rate of others /10  25.92  31.6  25.12  3.,0  8.87  14.61  233  5.45,
Log of average cost of child carellO  -22.71  177  -1956  1.44  -14.7  8.34  -3.53  3.95
Household regional dummies
Other urban areas of Russia  0.17  4.68  0.85  2,48  0.37  2.17  0.29  1.19
Moscow and St. Petersburg  -20.80  9.86  -22.44  1.  70  1.43  4.48  -0.43  2,51
North and North-West  -16.63  8.48  -i2.13  L,91  3.49  3.76  27:  1.97
Central  and Central  Chernozem  -12.00  7.80  -16.08  332-  4.11  3.76  -028  2.3
Volgo-Vyatskiy  1.73  8.44  .2,19  2.35  4.14  3.99  -3.71,  2,07
North Caucasis  0.42  8.50  -7.20  2.68  1.73  4.10  -. 93  2.23
Ural  -15.46  7.96  -19.72  2.06  8.22  3.73  0.11  1.94
Western Siberia  -12.38  7.94  -20.24  2.38  4.28  3.75  -1.62  2.01
Eastern  Siberia  Reference
Time  dummies
RoundS  -11.78  4.43  -11,66  -2.14  -0.03  2.02  4.08  1.18
Round  6  3.96  4.51  3.24  2,5  1.25  2.03  -2.03  - 1.24
Round  7  Reference
Characteristics  of  the  mother
Mother's  age in years /100  6.67  2.76  10.31  2.31  0.72  1.21  1.99  451
High school  completed  10.24  6.22  13.93  1.0  3.08  2.84  -04.91  1.42
Technical/vocational  school  14.34  5.36  -417.91  ,4  1.86  2.50  -L1.7  1.30
University  Reference
Log  of  mother's  wage/1i  46.6  80.2  33.18  3.20  55.2  34.8  1.89  8.97
Constant  116.55  26.23  121.55  4,32  -0.03  2.02  -2.22  4.00
33Table 6: Simulation of the effects of various policies on the household choices of child care mode
and mother's labor supply
Mother  does  Mother  works
not work
other  work,  other do not  other  work,  other do not
informal care  work,  formal care  work,  formal
informal care  and informal
care
Change in price of child  -5.7 (11.9)  2.5 (12.8)  1.0 (10.1)  0.8 (4.9)  1.4 (29.2)
care from 5.6 rubles per
hour to O
Change in offered mother's  -9.8 (24.0)  4.1 (17.3)  0.7 (7.5)  3.5 (18.4)  2.5 (21.2)
wage from  10 to 20 rubles
per hour
Change in offered other  -0.6 (1.3)  1.8 (8.2)  -2.8 (39.1)  4.2 (21.6)  -2.5 (77.0)
household members'  wage
from 10 to 20 rubles per
hour
Table 7: Effect of the demographic variables on the household choice of child care mode and
mother's  labor supply
Mother  does  Mother  works
not work
other  work,  other do not  other work,  other do not
informal care  work,  formal care  work, formal
informal care  and informal
care
Single mother relative to the  -4.8 (10.8)  -9.8 (83.0)  9.2 (53.1)  -0.01 (5.9)  6.3 (59.0)
married mother
Moscow and St. Petersburg  10.8 (18.9)  -7.1 (51.0)  -2.0 (27.3)  -5.8 (50.8)  3.9 (42.7)
relative to other  regions of
Russia
Mother  with a high school  13.2 (6.9)  -1.5 (7.5)  0.3 (3.7)  -5.2 (38.9)  -0.6 (14.1)
education relative to the
other mothers
Presence of children 0-18  40.2(50.4)  -11.6 (103.1)  -6.1 (114.5)  -16.7 (449.1)  -5.7 (560.7)
months of age
Presence of children  1.5-3  25.2 (37.7)  -2.3 (12.4)  -3.5 (52.6)  -14.3 (239.1)  -5.1 (314.5)
years old
Presence of children 3-7  -0.5 (0.97)  -3.4 (15.6)  1.5 (16.4)  -3.07 (19.6)  -1.5 (28.4)
years old
Presence of children  7-12  -5.9 (13.7)  6.1 (24.2)  0.3 (3.2)  0.8 (4.8)  -1.23 (27.1)
years old
34Table 8: Simulation of the three possible scenarios of the government supportfor the households
with children.
Percentage  change  Cost for  Total  Change  Who  is
the  increase  in total  eligible,
govern  in  hhold  # of
ment,  income  income,  eligible
1992  from the  per  bholds
Policy  instrument  mother's  mother's  formal  formal  rubles  change  eligible
labor  hours of  care use  care  per  in LFP  hhold
supply  work  hours  month  and
hours of
work
Child  care  subsidy  11.9  2.6  10.1  2.2  396,702  198,555  1,261.2  Formal
5.6-0.0  rubles/hour  child  care
users
471.9
Wage  subsidy  5.7  1.2  6.2  1.0  396,702  96,332  472.2  Working
10-12.06  mothers
rubles/hour  1044.1
Family  allowances  -0.2  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  396,702  (0)  198.5  All
transfer  households
1999
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